This report on the hearing about the Constellation Class is pretty damning. If you’re just tuning in and this Navy stuff is all new to you, here’s the situation.
We built 27 Ticonderoga class cruisers, they’re 9,600 tons each, the second “flight” of 22 each had 122 VLS cells.
We’ve built 74 Arleigh Burke class destroyed between 8,300 and 9,900 tons, early models had 90 VLS cells, then they quickly settled on 96 as standard.
We’re planning on building 20 of the Constellation class, a 7,200 ton displacement ship with 32 VLS cells.
VLS is short for Vertical Launch System. There are a couple of different depths, the deep ones are for strike weapons like the Tomahawk cruise missile, the shallow ones might hold quad packs of medium range Evolved Sea Sparrow anti-aircraft missiles. There are a variety of things in between, include the ASROC - an anti-submarine weapon that flies near an enemy submarine, then drops a torpedo by parachute.
These frigates are meant to replace the 4,200 ton Oliver Hazard Perry class, which did anti-mine and anti-sub duties, but which were not strong on air defense. The cruisers and destroyers have enough capacity to protect a formation involving a carrier or amphibious assault ship aka helicopter carrier. This new frigate has a far smaller magazine but it carries the same AEGIS combat system as the larger ships. A carrier typically goes out with a cruiser and a pair of destroyers to screen it, the cruisers are aging out, the planned twenty ships makes me think this is meant to be a junior partner with a pair of destroyers - same eyes, but less capable hands.
So it’s a ship that displaces 75% of the latest Arleigh Burke, at 50% of the cost, with a main battery 33% of the larger ship.
Prior Failures:
The U.S. Navy has three prior acquisition failures that are still in service today.
The Seawolf class submarines do their job well, but their rising costs got them cut off at just three units.
The Zumwalt class destroyers, 15,000+ ton stealth strike ships with 80 VLS cells, were cancelled after just three units due to rising cost and questionable utility. The pair of 155mm guns on each are idle - the specialized ammunition proved too expensive when there weren’t twenty of them to spread the cost.
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes, dubbed Little Crappy Ships by their crews, are two flavors of very small frigates, the futuristic 2,500 ton Independence class and the traditional looking 3,500 ton Freedom class. Their “modular everything” strategy is seen as a failure, their availability has been poor, and they’re being decommissioned after very short service lives.
Not all rare birds are failures - our original eighteen Ohio class ballistic missile boats were treaty limited to just fourteen, so the oldest four were refitted for conventional cruise missiles. They’ve been the U.S. Navy’s ace in the hole, with their 154 VLS cells. They sneak right up without detection to situations that might require aggressive measures.
But in general well done systems, like the Arleigh Burke, are like cats, with multiple lives (flights), their maturity means they get adapted for whatever comes next.
Conclusion:
The future of the Constellation class had been in doubt. Now with tariffs spiking steel costs, and DOGE being dispatched to “review”, the course has been set. I think we can expect future flight IV Arleigh Burkes, but maybe they won’t even complete the Constellation herself. We’re about to enter a grinding recession and this particular feeding trough is about to get upended.
If we had been able to do an 85% commonality version of the FREMM class frigates, that would have been a win. A mess that will roll on until a dramatically less capable ship ends up costing 85% of a proven destroyer design is an obvious loss in the making.